The Clash between Global Master-plans and Local Contexts: conflicts and contradictions within initiatives for payment of ecosystem services in Brazil and Nepal. by MARQUARDT, K. et al.
 866 
The Clash between Global Master-plans and Local Contexts: conflicts 
and contradictions within initiatives for payment of ecosystem 
services in Brazil and Nepal 
 
Kristina Marquardt1, Örjan Bartholdson1, Adam Pain1, Roberto Porro2 and Lennart 
Salomsson1 
 
1 Department of Urban and Rural Development Studies, Swedish University of Agricultural Sci-
ences,Sweden 
2 EMBRAPA, Bélem, Brazil 
 
Abstract: With the development of large-scale international agreements, such as REDD (United 
Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
dation in Developing Countries), it is becoming increasingly important to examine the synergy 
between global masterplans, national endeavors and local actions in relation to environmental 
services provision and to mitigation and adaption to climate change. This paper will draw on a 
comparative study of two countries’, Brazil and Nepal, strategies and practices to deal with car-
bon emissions, i.e. examining the tensions and contradictions between mitigation agendas and the 
roles, practices and interests of the actors in the programmes and projects related to REDD. The 
data has been collected from contrasting case studies within the two countries (REDD and non-
REDD cases). Preliminary evidence suggests that while the lack of synergy between global plans 
and local practices might be seen as simply a matter of ‘coordination’, it actually reflects compet-
ing interests and agendas, both at national and local levels. The REDD plans are guided by a ge-
neric template, but how these plans are interpreted and implemented at national and local levels 
varies greatly, both between and within participating countries. The complexity of the REDD 
schemes creates a demand for actors who can plan and broker the processes. This complexity and 
the lack of an overarching reflexivity create a number of problems linked to transparency, com-
plexity, lack of accountability and room for exploitation by powerful economic and political ac-
tors. This paper argues that these aspects often transform the planned results into unintended out-
comes, depending on the particular configuration of local contextual factors and processes. 
Keywords: paymentof ecosystem services, forest management, smallholder agriculture, climate 
change, Amazon, Himalaya 
 
Introduction 
There are currently two principal approaches for encouraging local ecosystem managers to regu-
late and value ES provision: the first creates a market system for ecosystem services (ES) and 
pays for ES provisioning (i.e. Payment for Ecosystem Services, PES); and the second supports 
existing crop/forestry production systems that are mainly based on local renewable resources (or 
ES or non-PES), and that integrate production of food and fibers with provision of ES. The re-
search project ‘Payment of Ecosystem Services – consequences and alternatives’ (PECA) is ex-
ploring these two approaches in four contrasting locations (Brazil, Nepal; Peru and Tanzania) 
examining the tensions between addressing the global public good and supporting the wellbeing 
of smallholder farmers. This paper draws on preliminary results from fieldwork in Brazil and 
Nepal. 
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The largest global PES initiative is the UN-REDD87 (United Nations Collaborative Programme 
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). 
This is focused on developing countries and the protection of forests to secure carbon sequestra-
tion, biodiversity and the integrity of water and nutrient cycles.  
In spite of the considerable documentation of the ecological effects of PES there are few ethno-
graphic studies of the communities that sign the PES contracts and the specific ecological, eco-
nomic, social and cultural impacts of these agreements (Caplow et al., 2010). There is also a lack 
of understanding of the on-going economic, political and social struggles and negotiations over 
PES and of how local communities are engaged and affected by this (Corbera&Schroeder, 2011).   
This paper explores four key themes contrasting the two approaches– the outcome of competing 
interests and actions of state bureaucracies and other actors, the role of brokers, the challenges of 
implementing PES-schemes in complex physical and social landscapes, and the consequences of 
the strong focus on carbon sequestration for poor farmers. 
 
Study Sites and Methods 
We report here on two contrasting case studies (PES and non-PES) in both Brazil and Nepal; one 
where land users are paid for the ES they provide and one where land users’ actions deliver ES, 
without receiving financial compensation. Table 1 summarizes the specific characteristics of the 
case studies. Data has been collected through participant observation, informal conversations and 
various forms of interviews, as well as archival sources and literature. Fieldwork has been carried 
out since November 2012 in close collaboration with colleagues at Forest Action in Nepal and 
EMBRAPA Eastern Amazon in Brazil.   
  
                                                
87 Throughout the document for the sake of comprehension we use the concept REDD for REDD and REDD+ incentive’s. 
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Table 1 Country Research Sites  
Country Research Sites Field Case Studies Informants 
Brazil 
Municipality of Anapú, 
state of Pará 
 
PES 
- IPAM/FVPP project with financial re-
sources from the Amazon Fund with 450 
families* (including an organic cocoa 
cooperative); 
Non-PES 
- Two cases of alternative land reform, 
labelled Projects for Sustainable Develop-
ment (PDS); with a total of near 400 fami-
lies; one of the cases engage in reduced 
impact logging 
 
* only 100 of these households are settled 
in Anapu. The others reside in two neigh-
bour municipalities: Pacajá and Senador 
José Porfírio.  
- Small-scale farmers and forest users 
- Regional NGO 
- Municipality officials 
- Governmental official and extension 
workers 
- National research institute - national 
and regional level 
- Farmer cooperatives 
- Farmer union 
- Church land organization 
- PES agents from the NGO IPAM  
 
Nepal 
Charikot, Dolokha District  
PES 
- Community Forest User Groups partici-
pating in REDD piloting project 
- Local PES arrangements 
Non-PES 
- Community Forest User Groups 
- Leaser holder Forest User Groups 
 
- Small-scale farmers and forest users 
- International NGO 
- National NGO 
- Local NGO – implementing - REDD 
piloting project 
- Government officials at national and 
regional levels 
- Community Forest User Leadership 
groups 
- Leaser Holder Forest User groups 
- International research institute 
 
 
 
Findings  
 
Country Contexts: contrasting farming systems 
We first briefly summarize the key characteristics of the farming systems onto which the PES 
systems have been superimposed. The study site in Nepal, Dolakha district, is located in the mid 
hills. The villages are long established and the lands are spread over the hillside. The slopes are 
covered by a mosaic of forests, field and grass areas. Most of the agricultural land is rain fed, but 
down slope irrigated terraces are found.  
Forest has long been a central resource to small holders, since it is an area for collection of ani-
mal fodder (branches and grass), animal bedding (dried leaves), as well as firewood and extract-
ing timber for construction and selling. In common with many Nepalese villages, the study vil-
lages have established over twenty years ago a Community Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) that 
not only led to forest recovery (Pokharel et al., 2007) but gave the community user rights to the 
forest areas surrounding the village. The CFUG regulations allow for individual extraction i.e. 
use for household but not for commercial purposes. The CFUGs on an annual basis harvest tim-
ber and non timber forest products for sale and this income is used for village development (e.g 
building bridges, schools, paths), social purposes (payments to the poorest households, etc.) and 
forest management. CFUGs mainly planted pine forests, but there are areas of mixed pine and 
broadleaved trees and only broadleaved trees. Fodder trees on agricultural land are becoming 
increasingly more important and peoples’ collection of fodder in the forest is decreasing. 
The characteristics of the Nepalese farming system are its mountain landscape, long history of 
settlement, small farm sizes of 0.1 – 1.5 ha, integration of forest and arable systems through live-
stock and a mosaic landscape with regenerated forest. However the system is in transition driven 
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by two contrasting processes. On the one hand, as a result of shrinking farm sizes and a failing 
rural economy, there has been significant outmigration leading to declining labour availability 
and a retreat into a low input subsistence system by those left behind. In the study CFUGs, up to 
50% of the households have a young male member working elsewhere. The resident households 
are sent remittances, which may be used to buy labour and food to a larger degree than before. On 
the other hand, in favourable locations with market access there has been a degree of intensifica-
tion with more commercialized agriculture, intensified livestock production and some use of ex-
ternal inputs. 
In contrast, the study site at the Brazilian Amazon is characterised by its recent settlement (fami-
lies moved into the areas after 2002), relatively large farm sizes, forest clearance and extensive 
farming practices through swidden-based systems. Most farmers in the municipality of Anapu, a 
hotspot for deforestation, are settlers who arrived in the area since the Transamazon highway was 
constructed in the 1970s, responding to the state offer of plots of land, often 100 hectares, for 
colonization (Simmons et al., 2007). According to the 1996 forest legislation, the settlers are re-
quired to maintain 80 percent of the area’s original forest on their land, and may only cultivate 20 
percent.  
The basic subsistence crops of rice, cassava, maize and beans are usually cultivated through a 
system of land use rotation that uses natural vegetation regeneration to restore soil fertility. Yet, 
farmers will return to a previously cropped plot only when primary forest is no longer available. 
This not only reflects the Amazonian dwellers’ traditional practice, but it is also a labour saving 
technique (and labour is scarce) for opening up forest land. In addition, the basic ashes provide 
nutrients and improve the often very acid soil conditions for the crops. The main cash crop in 
Anapu is cocoa. However, the soil quality is frequently poor and for those farmers cultivating the 
poorer soils the cash crop alternatives are cassava, pasture, bananas, and the management and 
extraction of native palm fruit acai (Euterpe olearacea). Livestock is common in the region and 
cattle numbers are increasing. The grazing is often conducted very extensively and farmers some-
times cultivate pasture with the purpose to rent it out. The farmers do not collect manure, and 
rarely utilize chemical fertilizers. More often they use pesticides, if they can afford them.  
Global and national REDD/PES masterplans and context specific implementation  
Onto these two contrasting farming systems the REDD global masterplan has been superimposed 
but as will be seen with very different modalities and effects. 
In Nepal the REDD initiative has been led by the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation 
(MOFSC) and welcomed by both state and non-state actors. It has basically followed the REDD-
global model, pushed by the World Bank (through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility). Nepal 
has a weak state, subject to strong influence by external donors and the model of REDD has not 
been questioned. However, MOFSC is a relatively strong ministry and there has been a long his-
tory of contention over forest resources between it and local forest users. Since the early 1990s 
activism by national NGOs in relation to forest rights has led to the growth of community based 
forest groups supported by strong participatory forest management initiatives and institutions. 
The growth of community based forestry at a time of relative state weakness may currently be 
under challenge as there are signs that the MOFSC is seeking to take back some of the powers 
that has ceded to the communities, using REDD to achieve this (Khatri, 2012 , Paudel et al., 
2012). 
In contrast in Brazil many forms of payment of ecosystem services (PES) have been initiated and 
REDD is only one of them. However, REDD in Brazil may achieve the scale of a mega venture 
as the country intends to set off 320 000 km2, an area equivalent to two thirds of Sweden, in the 
Amazon region (Serviço Florestal Brasileiro, 2010). Common to government-sponsored PES 
incentives is that the state is reluctant to allow foreign driven schemes, and strives to maintain 
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financial and administrative control over the PES-projects. External money is funnelled into the 
Amazon Fund, managed by the Brazilian Social and Economic Development Bank (BNDES) and 
then redistributed to PES-projects presented by both government organizations and NGOs, and 
submitted through competitive calls. There are, however, also private initiatives where specific 
groups measure and certify carbon within demarcated territories and then attempt to find carbon 
sequestration investors on the private transnational voluntary market (Bonfante et al., 2012). 
In Nepal REDD has been piloted in a catchment in Dolakha with with 58 CFUGs during 2009-
2013 as well as in two other catchments (Gorkha and Chitwan). The pilot has largely focused on 
aspects of carbon sequestration measurement and payment mechanisms (Skutsch, 2012), reflect-
ing a narrow technocratic agenda (Paudel et al., 2013) and the collective management of forests. 
The incentives and the payments are appointed toward the CFUGs. The PES project studied in 
Anapu region is actually broader in scope. It includes REDD funding and it targets 450 small-
scale farms and individual farmers. The scheme prohibits slash-and-burn and the intention is to 
offer the farmers continuous extension services and provide alternative land use systems and 
technologies. The farmers receive a modest monetary compensation and the main incentive for 
farmers to join the scheme is the opportunity to receive extension services, which for all farmers 
are very scarce in the region, and eventually access to other sources of financial or built capital. 
Demand for actors who can plan and broker the processes  
The current REDD process in Nepal has been led by the MOFSC in collaboration with donors 
(particularly the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Norad). FECOFUN, the 
NGO initiated to represent the interests of the CFUGs has been the principal broker between the 
CFUGs and REDD. FECOFUN represents small-scale forest users in 15000 CFUGs and other 
community based forest management groups, promoting and protecting users’ rights. In the past 
FECOFUN has been more of an adversary than a collaborator with MOFSC. However, in seeking 
to be active in the REDD process, in part related to reasons of funding, FECOFUN became the 
implementing NGO of the pilot REDD project (in collaboration with other two international 
NGOs). At each site/watershed level a REDD Network, represented by chairpersons of all the 
involved CFUGs, District Forest Office (DFO) and local governments has been established. 
FECOFUN has been quite instrumental in introducing REDD but with a mixed agenda; it appears 
to be on the side of forest users but it is perceived as ‘captured’ by project funding and became 
subject to criticism from its members. CFUGs outside the REDD pilot have questioned whether 
FECOFUN continues to represent all the CFUGs when its attention have been focused towards 
the REDD pilot CFUGs at the regional level. In this process, the model of REDD has not been 
questioned and not even the key non-government actors have challenged its impact on forest gov-
ernance and local livelihoods. Instead they have treated REDD as a source of funding (Paudel et 
al., 2012).  
In the Brazilian case, regardless of whether the farmers of the Anapu area are part of the PES-
project or not, they often negotiate with numerous state agencies and NGOs. Both federal and 
state bodies deal with the farmers, both directly or through consultancies and NGOs. The rural 
unions, social movements, the Catholic land committee, NGOs, university faculty and researchers 
also play an important role. Specifically in Anapu, a convoluted political process resulted from 
internal disputes within farmers’ organizations. Members of the farmers’ union have been ac-
cused of cooperating informally with illegal loggers and the union has a severe conflict with the 
federal land reform agency, INCRA, which is one of the most important rural actors. In this com-
plex web of actors there is no neutral position, and the conflicts and tensions are reproduced with-
in the farmer communities, causing deep tensions. The traditional patron-client relationships with 
large landowners have thus been replaced with a multi-stranded patron-client network, which the 
farmers have to find their way through, either directly or through mediation by brokers. Leaders 
of the farmer communities have greater contact with these external actors than ordinary farmers, 
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and facilitated access to material resources and wider networks stimulates residents to apply for 
management positions at local organizations, what does not necessarily reflect actual leadership. 
PES-schemes in complex physical and social landscapes 
The REDD pilot project in Nepal is as noted (Skutsch et al. 2012) with a technocratic agenda. 
Further it has determined that 40% of the payments should be used for forest management and 
60% for social purposes. However this exercise has taken place in a complex physical landscape. 
The village forest areas in the hills are fragmented, diverse and not very large (seldom over 100 
ha), relatively spare and slow growing and are not carbon rich forests. Brazil on the other hand, 
has fast growing, carbon rich forest vegetation in one of the most biodiverse biomes on the plan-
et. In both areas the timber represents a high value resource and illegal loggers are present, how-
ever the value of the timber in the forest frontier in Brazil is considerably greater than in Himala-
yan Mountains of Nepal 
The REDD pilot or PES projects are also engaging with complex, dynamic and diverse social 
settings. In the case of Nepal REDD it has been superimposed onto a history of already accumu-
lated carbon through social forestry during the last decades. It has also been superimposed on an 
existing social organisation (the CFUG). But the membership of CFUG shows strong social 
(caste) and economic differentiation in terms of assets, incomes and forest dependence is varia-
ble. Thus there is a contrast between the interests and relative power of a high caste family with 
monthly pension from the army, one ha of irrigated and rain fed land, with 2 cows and 4 goats 
and a low caste family with 0.3 ha of poor quality rain fed land and 1-2 goats who survive on 
daily farm wage labour. Both are members of the same CFUG but do not have the same social 
position within the group or the same possibilities to participate in activities. Some interviewed 
households said that they could not afford to go to the REDD meeting as they had to work for 
wages to earn their living. Caste identity also services to restrict or enable different households 
within the CFUG in different and various ways (World_Bank, 2007). 
The scope of REDD related programs in Brazil has been controversial due to the extremely 
skewed land distribution in the country. Some discourses target the poorest farmers, extractivist 
groups as well as indigenous people. However, other sectors argue that land-based schemes such 
as REDD will benefit the largest landowners who will receive compensation for not expanding 
their pastures or soy fields. Farmers who participate in the REDD program in the municipality of 
Anapu have been selected by the rural union and the Amazon Environmental Research Institute 
(IPAM), an NGO which plays an important mediating role between the state, social movements 
and farmers. This means that the specific farmer groups targeted, with their mode of production, 
social organization, sources of livelihood and the forms and intensity of the non-economic sup-
port have important impacts on the implementation and results of REDD. 
Since 2010 the participating CFUGs in Nepal in the pilot areas have received sums about 500-
1000 € per year. The targeting to the poorest has mainly been interest free loans to buy animals or 
to start vegetable farming and different kinds of training. The interviewed CFUGs however say 
that forest management practices have remained the same as before the REDD pilot projects. 
CFUGs outside REDD also direct some of the community forest earnings to the most marginal-
ized people. 
In Brazil the financial payments that farmers who participate in PES (approximately 50 USD per 
month) corresponds to about 15% of a monthly minimum wage in the country, which is not 
enough to compensate reduced yields due to the lack of burning, insufficient to hire workers and 
thus leaving the farmer with a cost rather than a gain when participating. So far the PES project 
has run one year out of the planned five year period, and it is too early to evaluate whether or not 
it will succeed, but it is speculated that the low level of compensation might prevent farmers for 
participating, however on the other hand the other project benefits may provide the needed attrac-
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tiveness, if the extension work is well implemented. The first year consisted mainly of an admin-
istrative and communicative starting-up phase. As noted the technical assistance provided by the 
PES-project is not coordinated with assistance from other actors, except the land agency INCRA, 
but rather constitutes a parallel autonomous strand. 
 
PES and the focus on carbon versus other environmental services provided in existing 
farming systems 
Our research findings indicate that existing strong formal, sectorial and bureaucratic divisions 
that compartmentalize forestry and agriculture tend to be exacerbated by REDD. But that division 
is not reflected in peoples’ livelihoods or farming systems and it is the connections between for-
estry and agriculture that emerges strongly in all cases in resource management practices of poor 
people. There is a disjuncture between the ecosystem service dynamics in the existing livelihood 
systems on the one hand and the structure and governance to deal with the ecosystem service 
payments from forests on the other. 
In Nepalese traditional hill farming systems there is significant nutrient flow between forestry 
and agriculture, a transformation of ES with the help of livestock; forest nutrients are processed 
through livestock feed and leaf litter used for bedding and become the manure applied to fields. 
Most farmers produce mainly for subsistence although there is a growing amount of commercial 
vegetable cropping using external inputs. Declining livestock numbers and intensification of pro-
duction combined with an increasing role for on-farm agroforestry and private forests in provid-
ing fodder may be reducing nutrient outflows from forests. The community forests are quite well 
established mature forests, managed mainly for timber and to a certain degree NTFPs (e.g. car-
damom, loktha and daphne (used for paper), argeli (used as pepper).  
One of the unintended consequences when CFUGs were given the user rights over their adjacent 
forests, and livestock grazing in forests became more regulated was that in combination with the 
high outmigration to the cities, an increasing number of trees and forests were planted on private 
agricultural land. Somewhat ironically from the REDD perspective, it seems like it is actually in 
the agricultural land where the rate of carbon sequestration is significant. In the studied 
CFUGs10-20% of the agricultural land was covered by trees and forest, which corresponds to an 
area equivalent to 20-40% of their forest areas. The interesting aspect of these private forest/trees 
is that they are planted and managed according to the use and need of the local household (fod-
der, timber, NTPF) rather than the regulations of the CFUG or the global community. There are 
indications that in several of the REDD pilot participating CFUGs, the strong focus on carbon 
sequestration is contradictory to villagers’ use and need for forest with respect to species prefer-
ence, degree of canopy cover and management actions.  
Further the mosaic of forest and agricultural land, with heavy investments in terracing, creates 
landscape stability, an essential ingredient in an environment where landslides are a major haz-
ard. Nevertheless, this diverse mosaic landscape the farmers act in, is not reflected in how natural 
resources are dealt with in decision and policy making. Rather, there is a sharp sectorial divide 
between forestry and agricultural land, each having distinct tenure regimes and property rights. 
Equally when it comes to ministries, governmental officials, and professional training, they all 
have sectorial specialization, which are not conducive to creating strategies for natural resources 
and ES provision at a landscape level and integrating the roles of forestry and agriculture land 
use.  
In Brazil the settlers in the Anapu municipality practice swidden farming, cultivating subsistence 
crops such as rice, maize and cassava and as a main cash crop cocoa, practices that challenge 
forest conservation. However, REDD money in Anapu has been channelled into a PES initiative 
and a strict carbon and forest focus that departs from a broader farm perspective. The extension 
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services have mainly focused on agricultural practices, such as farming without burning, limiting 
the pasture size through intensification, and the establishment of permanent tree crops (cacao), 
i.e. actions that are all favourable for ES, but mainly within agricultural lands. A new national 
forest law has been approved in 2012, which obliges a majority of farmers’ land to be kept under 
forest cover. Advanced remote sensing surveillance is being used to monitor deforestation at the 
landholding level, and farmers who do not comply with the standards are barred from access to 
credit. Yet, no mechanisms have been devised to foster reduced impact logging or sustainable 
forest management in these lands. Farmers’ possibilities and will to maintain the forest cover is of 
course dependent on how their production develops on their agricultural land, but there are also 
powerful actors influencing the small holders’ forest management decisions.  
There are a number of actors -federal and state entities, as well as NGOs and private consultan-
cies - that offer the farmers extension services. The actual technical assistance the farmers receive 
is however insufficient and poorly coordinated, thus decreasing the synergy and impact potential. 
The crucial factor for limiting deforestation does not seem to be the choice between PES and non-
PES programs, but rather the scope and depth of extension services offered by state and non-state 
actors. However, the challenge to find long-term sustainable agricultural alternatives in areas that 
are not suitable for agriculture in the first place remains so far unsolved. Our research shows the 
importance of initiating agrarian and social processes of change (including perception of forest 
and wild biodiversity) together with the local farmers, as a way to find possible alternatives or 
variants to the present swidden agricultural system. A major problem in the case study in the 
Amazon is the lack of public support for sustainable forestry, what exacerbates the expression of 
interests of private companies and illegal logging. Increased enforcement to environmental regu-
lations in the past decade has heavily hit the logging sector, but informal and illegal operations 
are still widespread. Economic and political power of the logging sector, and the occurrence of 
illegal logging is still strong in Anapu. The money they pay for timber offers needed capital to 
small-scale farmers. Even the forest management initiative carried out in one of the case studies 
resulted strongly dependent on the interests of a private logging company. In five years of im-
plementation, the lack of public monitoring of practices imposed by the logging company al-
lowed patron-client relations and even prompted the expression of distrusts within farmers’ or-
ganizations. Furthermore, both leading politicians and members of the rural union are allegedly 
cooperating with loggers, thus eroding the resistance to both deforestation and to community ini-
tiatives towards sustainable forest management. It is unclear how the PES-project shall be able to 
mitigate the loggers’ activities, not least since the project is executed in close cooperation with 
the rural union.  
Indigenous reserves may constitute a major potential location for forest related PES projects. 
There are 663 reserves in Brazil, covering more than one million km2, mostly in the Amazon. 
Here PES-projects, particularly REDD, could provide indigenous people with investments and 
external monitoring of the threatened borders of their reserves. However, except in situations 
funded by the voluntary market, these schemes should also follow regulations imposed by the 
federal government. So far only the Suruí people in Rondonia state have established a REDD 
demarcated area. 
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Discussion 
 
The outcome of competing interests and actions of state bureaucracies and other actors 
The bureaucratic organization and the schemes designed to create sustainable agriculture and 
forest management rarely take into consideration the local contexts and how these influence the 
outcome of these schemes. The bureaucracy is often poorly coordinated and unable to efficiently 
tackle illegal logging and their role in local informal economic and political alliances. Affluent 
actors are often able to use money and political contacts to dodge political restrictions, in contrast 
to farmers. This is particularly salient in the case of forest management in Brazil, where the state 
prioritizes the interests of large companies, while monitoring and sanctions against mismanage-
ment and illegal logging seldom target the real culprit, but mostly the farmers. 
The role of brokers 
The bureaucratic complexity and hierarchy of REDD make small-scale farmers dependent on 
multi-stranded patron-client relationships to achieve financial and political ends. The gap be-
tween smallholders and decision-makers is often bridged by brokers, who tend to have their own 
agendas, thus affecting the communication between farmers and authorities. One example in Bra-
zil is the prominent role played by the rural union in the selection of households that are offered 
to participate in the PES scheme. Another example is the important advisory role of NGOs (i.e. 
FVPP and IPAM) functioning as brokers between farmers and government agencies. In the case 
of Anapu, however, the alleged cooperation of members of the rural union with loggers thus has 
the potential of dividing smallholders into antagonistic factions and counteract sustainable forest 
management objectives as well as the provision of ES. 
In Nepal FECOFUN has traditionally been the NGO representing the CFUGs but presently trans-
formed into a promoter of REDD. At a regional level FECOFUN has become dependent on 
REDD for financing and at the same time has failed to ask critical questions on the effects REDD 
might have on rural households in the mountainous landscape such as Dolakha. There is a risk 
that FECOFUN as the implementing agent in seeking to piloting how to monetize the value of 
ecosystem services in the forest, has not actually safeguarded the interest of the CFUGs. A fur-
ther question is who the local CFUG represents. The set up of CFUGs and their experience of 
projects have been factors that most probably have been highly favourable for implementation of 
the REDD pilot. However, it might also have contributed to overlooking how the poorest house-
holds depend on the forest for their livelihoods and farming systems.  
The PES schemes’ technical complexity, its implications, and the strong focus on carbon 
sequestration 
Our research shows that it is of vital importance to avoid the sectorial divisions between forest 
and agriculture and offer smallholders extension and training where agriculture and forest man-
agement are integrated components of the farm and the landscape and where biodiversity, water, 
soil fertility, landscape stability are interlaced parts of the aim of the management, as well as car-
bon sequestering. Moreover, these biophysical components should be treated in unison as a con-
stituent part of a broader social-ecological system, therefore taking into consideration the singu-
larities of the involved social groups.   
A strong carbon focus appears to have marginalised locally and nationally relevant discussions on 
provision; and thereby diminished the potential significance of ecosystem service management by 
poor people in adapting to climate change. There is no quick fix to achieve and integrate sustain-
able agriculture and forest maintenance, instead several different policy areas and measures are 
necessary, where individual or community group based PES could be one option, if it is included 
as one part of an integrated support package for small-scale farmers, interlacing food production 
and provision of ES on a landscape level 
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Most of the REDD-projects which have been implemented are called pilot projects; i.e. their 
function and their outcomes one might suppose are being closely monitored and assessed so that 
if and when the REDD scheme is launched it can build on these experiences and address the 
weaknesses of the pilot projects. However, it would appear that the pilot has been designed to 
vindicate the REDD approach and criteria for assessments have been poorly developed. While the 
initiative studied in Brazil is still in its early stages for a proper assessment, we suggest that the 
REDD pilot scheme in Nepal has focused more on how to monetize carbon sequestration and 
how to make payments, rather than address the practices to increase carbon sequestration and 
improve rural livelihoods and the sustainability of farming systems. 
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